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The dialogue between the governments in the developed and developing countries,
whatever the level or forum, is  basically about changing government policies
to improve economic growth in developing countries.  The willingness of and
need for governments to change policies varies.  Some governments  are not
adverse to a few housekeeping  improvements  in the international effects  of
their own policies, and  in the institutional aspects of the world's economic
system.  But there are governments who seek major changes, particularly by
others.
In broad foreign policy terms, the EC position on the North-South Dialogue
could be characterized as somewhere between the mild enthusiasm of Canada and
the cautionary approach of the United States. 1/
The dialogue takes place in a diplomatic context, and this brings several
biases.  One is the emphasis on international rather than national impediments
to growth. Another is that the beliefs of government officials  in an
exaggerated role for governments and international organizations  are apt to
prevail.  Above all, the necessary diplomatic norm of  "keeping channels open"
ensures that in the dialogue it  is difficult  to distinguish ritual from
reality, views  from actions.
The agenda in the dialogue is  not fixed and is  clearly being influenced by the
current poor global economic  conditions.  To a large degree, the ability of
the EC to contribute to internationally coordinated improvements  in the
world's trading, financial and food security systems have been both improved
and hampered by the CAP.
The CAP has an impact on all developing countries,  via its trade practices
which affect key international agricultural markets.  As a result, there is
widespread interest in the CAP's external impacts,  but the complexities and
the number of countries involved has  led to either general or topic-by-topic
(Lome Convention, sugar, and so on) reviews.  There is  comparatively little
quantitative research on the net  impact of the CAP,  including export subsidies
1/ Commission of the European Community.  "Communities Policy for the
North-South Dialogue,"  CO  (81) 68,  Brussels, Belgium, May 7,  1981;  and "North
South Relations" COM (81) 323, Brussels, Belgium, June 18, 1981.
164and other EC policies, particularly aid, on a large number of individual
developing  countries 2/.
Trade Issues
Trade is  featured in the Dialogue and attention  is focused on access to
markets  and supplies and on the level and stability of commodity prices.  The
EC procedural view is that progress should be made on both trade topics on a
global basis in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and  in the
commodity fora.  The general Community view on trade  issues is that priority
lies with strengthening the trading system and that  special concessions to
developing countries have to be supportive of this main mutual  interest.
In its foreign economic policy towards developing  countries the EC has
generally given priority to trade  issues, though aid is by no means
neglected.  Since the EC  is  still mainly a customs union, EC policy options
are apt  to be confined to the trade field.  Member states have preferred to
distribute bilaterally nearly 90 percent of their development assistance
funds.  The EC's  liberal trading stance is marred like that in the United
States by sectoral exceptions notably agriculture and textiles.  These two
sectors loom large in EC trade with developing countries--together they
accounted  for 24 percent of total EC imports  (56 percent of EC imports,
excluding petroleum) from developing countries  in 1980.  The EC emphasizes
that 90 percent of its  industrial  imports  and 60 percent of agricultural
imports from developing countries enter duty free.  Recently, adjustment
problems in some industries,  current worldwide recession, and EC perceptions
of developing countries' needs have led the EC in its negotiating position in
the North-South dialogue to put less emphasis on trade.  More emphasis has
2/  Josling, T. "The European Community Agricultural Policies and the
Interest of Developing Countries,"  Overseas Development Review No. I, 1979.
London, United Kingdom.
Tangermann, S.,  "Policies of the European Community and Agricultural Trade
with Developing Countries,"  Proceedings of the 17th International Conference
of the International Association of Agricultural Economists, Gower, UK, 1981.
Wagstaff, H.  R.,  "EEC Food Imports from the.  Third World and International
Responsibility in Agricultural Policy,"  European Review of Agricultural
Economics, Vol.  2.1,  1974/75.
World Development Movement, "The CAP and the Developing Countries,"
London,1October 1978.
Centre for Development Research, "The EEC and Agriculture in the Developing
Countries, Trends  in EEC Agricultural Policy:  Possible Consequences  for the
Developing Countries,"  Copenhagen, 1981.
Stevens, C. (ed.),  The EEC  and the Third World, A Survey of the European
Community, New York, Holmes & Meier,  1982.
Commission of  the European Communities, "The Common Agricultural Policy and
the EEC's Trade Relations in the Agricultural Sector (Effects on Developing
Countries),"  SEC(82) 1223, Brussels, 14  July 1982.
European Parliament, working documents, 1980-81:  "Report of the Committee on
Development and Cooperation on the Contribution of the EEC on the Fight
Against World Hunger,"  DOC. 1-341/801, August 1980.
European Parliament, working documents, 1982-83:  "Report of the Committee
on Development and Cooperation on Measures Following the European Parliament
Debate on World Hunger,"  and "Commission of the European Communities.
Communication from the Commission to the Council Concerning a Plan of Action
to Combat World Hunger,"  COM (81) 560, June 7,  1982.
165been put on financial issues, energy, commodities, and  food.  In  practice,  the
latter two items have a large trade-policy content.
The EC is  only partially equipped to handle the main trade  issues.  The Common
External Tariff does provide a basis for coping with market-access  issues,  but
in terms of access to supplies--important  to the EC  in view of  its mineral and
petroleum import dependency 3/--there is  no equivalent policy  basis.
Similarly, except on some CAP products, the EC does not have readily available
the  legal and policy arrangements to provide much to developing countries on
the issue of  the level and stability of prices.
In negotiations on international commodity agreements on nonCAP products,
there is a good deal of  consultation and cooperation between member states;
most formalized perhaps  for the bilateral arrangements on textiles and
steel.4/  Cooperation for multilateral agreements partially reflects the
combined importance  of the EC-10.  For instance, coffee is the leading
agricultural export of developing countries and, as  the  EC  imports  a  third of
the world coffee supplies, it has a significant voting  weight  in  any
agreement.  In addition, the EC can exert a small pricing  influence via its
own and member states' development assistance policies.  By giving aid to
coffee production in ACP states, it can insure a preferential margin for these
countries over supplies from South America. 5/  The  main  influence  of  EC  views
and actions in practice on market access and pricing is,  nevertheless, on
products covered by the CAP.
Agricultural Trade
The founders of the CAP can barely be blamed for not forseeing the extent the
CAP would impact on EC relations with developing countries.  The  trade  policy
stance at that time included no quantitative import restrictions, privileged
market access for former colonies, and a predisposition to  manage
international commodity markets with formal commodity arrangement was
considered to be in the interest of  the developing countries.
But the powerful motor of a  politically driven agricultural  policy  of  high  and
stable farm support prices has now pushed EC agriculture  beyond  the  security
of  the  self-sufficiency  ideals.  Now  EC  agriculture  has  a  growing  dependency
on the uncertain outcomes of the annual bargaining between EC  governments over
EC budgetary issues  and on imperfect international agricultural markets.  The
disposal  of the surpluses, particularly the half  in budgetary terms  (some $7.9
billion in 1980) that is  disposed of with explicit export subsidies, has
hampered the growth of political confidence within the Community in EC  ideals,
and brought new external strains for the EC  in the numerous relationships that
make up the  interdependencies of international trade.
The  CAP  now  distorts agricultural trade of  developing  countries  in  several
ways  for  CAP  and  CAP-related  products.  Generally,  the  volume  imported  into
the EC is  lowered by relatively high internal prices and  import restrictions.
3/  Stakhovitch,  A.,  "A European  View  of  Commodity  Problems:  Stabilization
of  Prices  and  Stabilization  of  Receipts,"  in  Stabilizing  World  Commodity
Markets, F. G. Adams, and S.A. Klein (eds.), Lexington, 1978.
4/  D.  Hurd,  "Political Cooperation," International Affairs,  Summer  1981.
5/  The  European  Development  Fund  has  spent  or  is  expected  to  spend  at least
100 million ECU on coffee development largely to  expand coffee exports--see
"Coffee, Cocoa, Bananas,"  European Information--Development, DE 34,  Jan. 1982.
166Conversely, for some products, the volume of imports  is  increased or
maintained by special quotas  or lowered tariff rates for selected developing
countries and by the additional demand generated for nongrain feeds because of
high bilateral prices for cereals.  Non-EC demand may have  increased and taste
preferences changed because of exports of subsidized prices.
Generally, export earnings and production of developing countries are  lowered
by import restrictions.  However, some developing countries  increase or
maintain their export earnings because of special market-access  conditions.
Earnings from and production for non-EC or third country markets are  likely to
have been lowered as a  result of export subsidies.
Quantitative insight into the  initial effects of  those distortions  and the
extent of the transfers  to and from the developing countries is  patchy and
somewhat overtaken by recent events;  notably the increased use of export
subsidies  and cereal substitutes.  Current trade levels provide a  starting
point.
The EC member countries,  council, and commission are apt to  counter charges of
protectionism by emphasizing both the size of EC agricultural  imports and the
modesty of the exports.  Agricultural imports from developing countries in
1980 on a  per capita basis were $114,  compared with $62  in  the United States,
and  $48  in  Canada.  The agricultural trade  surplus that  developing  countries
earned  in  EC-9  markets--$15.7 billion  in 1980--is  probably  more  important  in
the economic growth of more countries  than the other major  developing  country
trade surplus on petroleum.  In  contrast,  the developing countries'
agricultural trade deficit with North America was $7  billion  ($5.8 billion
with the United States and  $1.2 with Canada) in  1980.  Of  the EC's
agricultural imports in  1979 from developing countries,  59 percent entered
duty free.  Duties  (related to both the CAP  and food industry protectionism)
were imposed on 33 percent and levied on 7  percent.  Of  the EC exports to
developing countries, 90 percent directly benefited from export subsidies.
Restrictions on Market Access
Border protection has played an important role in  the EC's achievement of both
a  high degree of food self-sufficiency and farm-price stability.  Also, to a
less obvious extent EC farmers'  incomes have been increased.  The income-
redistributive effects of those distortions have affected relations between EC
member states; between the EC and other developed,  lower cost producers
(Australia, Canada, Yugoslavia, New Zealand, and the United States);  and
between the EC and developing countries.  The restrictions as  far as
developing countries are  concerned,  cover CAP and CAP-related products  and
provide the food industry with considerable protection.
Johnson, 1964;  Cline,  and others, 1978, and Valdes and Zietz, 1980, 6/  have
assessed quantitatively the impact on developing countries of agricultural
trade protectionism by developed countries.  Valdes and Zietz estimate that a
6/  Johnson, D.G. "Agriculture and Foreign Economic Policy, J.F.E. Dec.
1964.  Cline, W.R. and others "Trade Negotiations in  the Tokyo Round--A
Quantitative Assessment" Brookings,  1978.  Valdes, A.  and Zietz J.
"Agricultural Protection in  OECD Countries:  Its Cost to Less Developed
Countries", IFPRI Research Report No.  21, Dec. 1980.
1675-percent reduction across the board in tariffs and other trade barriers for
99 commodities imported by 17  OECD countries results  in 36  percent of the
benefits in increased trade, approximately $3 billion, going to  the developing
countries.  Valdes and Zietz indicate that South American  beef  and  sugar
exports were particularly affected by EC import controls.  In the model
developed, the EC was initially a net exporter of $120 million in sugar and
its derivatives.  After the 50 percent cut in tariffs, the EC reduced  its
sugar exports by $690 million and  increased its imports  by  $644,  with  a  net
effect for developing countries of  increasing exports of  sugar and derivative
products by $1.3  billion per year.
Other recent research on the impact of EC-trade measures on developing country
trade takes more account of export subsidies.  Richards  7/ suggests  that
removal of the EC sugar-support measures  could increase other countries  sugar-
export  earnings  by  15-24 percent  a  year,  some  $365-570  million  a  year  for  the
developing countries.  Some unpublished work by Paarlberg and Sharples 8/
suggests the world wheat price could be 4 percent higher in the absence of EC
export subsidies.  With wheat imports of  the developing  countries  at  10
million tons in 1981/82 and at an average gulf price of $170 a ton, this 4
percent rebate for wheat imports, partially at wheat-exporters'  expense, could
have been worth $687 million to developing countries  in  reduced wheat-import
payments.  Both of  these studies concluded that the EC would remain a  net
exporter of respectively  sugar and wheat.  Such results seem to  indicate that
the current costs to the developing countries of lost  export  sales  due  to  EC
market-access restrictions may be less than the earlier studies implied.
A plausible interpretation of the available quantitative  work  could  be  that,
whereas in the past there was clear evidence that the CAP had a significant
net cost to the developing countries, now the current situation is  not so
clear.  The size of the potential market for developing countries in the EC
may have shrunk because of improved competitiveness of  European  producers.
And removal of the export subsidies,  in the short term,  could,  in  the
aggregate, make the developing countries worse off.
Besides restrictions on market access and export subsidies,  another feature of
the CAP,  as currently implemented, is that it damages developing countries as
a result of a  policy of understocking, which destabilizes international
markets.  There are financial incentives  in the EC to understock, if  export
subsidies are allowed and used, since  it can be cheaper to sell with such
subsidies rather than to store.  The EC has not used storage policy to absorb
the  shocks  of  domestic  production  fluctuations.  EC  production  instability  is
highly correlated with EC export  instability.  Since the EC has significant
sugar-production  instability, as  shown by Schmitz and Koester 9/ and its  share
of world production and trade has increased, it  has increased world sugar-
7/  Richards,  I.M.  "EEC  Sugar  Support  Policies  and  World  Market Prices:  A
Comparative  Static  Analysis,"  Australian Bureau  of  Agricultural  Economics,
January, 1982.
8/  Personal communication of Philip Paarlberg and Jerry Sharples, Economic
Research Service, USDA, December 1982.
9/ Schmitz,  P.M.  and  Koester,  U.  "The  EC  Sugar  Market  Policy  and  the
Stability of World Market Prices for Sugar" Paper presented at the Trade
Research Consortium Meeting. 17-18 Dec. 1981.  Berkeley, California.
168instability.  The recent changes  in the EC's sugar-stocking policy may lessen
in the future some of this transference of domestic production instability
onto the international sugar market,  in which developing  countries in 1980
accounted for 64  percent of exports  and 41 percent imports.  The wheat case is
discussed subsequently under food security.
Since its  creation, the Community has endeavoured to reconcile the conflicting
interests of its  own agricultural producers and food-processing  industries
with similar interests in developing countries.  There have been numerous
efforts  to reduce the impact of the import controls associated with the CAP on
developing countries.
Encouragement of Market Access
The CAP principle of Community preference is  apt to foster an ethos whereby
anything that could be produced domestically and is  not, is  somehow a
concession to, or a positive gesture  in favor of non-Community countries.
Agricultural imports  into the EC  from developing countries have been
encouraged, or at  least allowed  into the EC market by, in effect,  five
different types of preferential trade arrangements.  Most of these are
arranged  in a hierarchy, with some former colonies having more favorable
access than other developing countries, who have more favorable access than
developed countries.  These preferences have a tangible value to the
recipients,  and they provide solid evidence of EC concern that economic growth
in developing countries should not be hampered by EC agricultural
protectionism.  The arrangements probably hamper the unity of the Group of  77
in mounting a  diplomatic  offensive against the CAP.  The arrangements probably
cover less than a quarter of total agricultural imports,  and less than half of
the agricultural imports from developing countries.  The schemes cover the
Overseas Departments of France, Mediterranean countries,  and the ACP
countries.  In addition, they include the Community's generalized system of
preferences and agreements governing trade in nongrain feeds.
Overseas Departments.  Since the establishment  of the  CAP,  exports  including
agricultural exports,  from the Overseas Departments of  France  have  largely
free access to the EC market.  These departments include  Guadeloupe,
Martinique, Guiana, Reunion, and Ste. Pierre and Miquelon.  The population of
the Overseas Departments  is very small  (1.24 million in 1980),  and their
agricultural exports to the EC at $313 million  in 1980 were 1 percent of EC
agricultural imports from developing countries.  They are of some significance
in the management of the sugar regime of the CAP as  their sugarcane exports to
the EC  (336,500 tons  in 1980)  were equal to about 5 percent of EC  sugar
exports.  There are other arrangements  for the Departments that affect
developing countries' agricultural exports  to the EC,  such as  the assurance of
two thirds of the French banana market to Guadeloupe and Martinique.
Mediterranean Countries.  The EC's  foreign policy perspective on relations
with developing countries in the Mediterranean basin continues to evolve.
Initially, historical trade and aid linkages of  international member countries
were repackaged into an EC context.  Then a broader Mediterranean policy
evolved, which sought the harmonization of EC policies and tariff concessions
to equalize the competitive trade position (not trade  concessions) among the
Mediterranean countries.  Taylor 10/  has suggested  the principal motivations
10/  R. Taylor, "Implications for the Southern Mediterranean Countries of
the Second Enlargement of  the European Community,"  Europe Information
Development, June 1980.
169for the EC's Mediterranean policy at the outset were essentially political and
strategic.  The Mediterranean  was seen as an EC  zone  of  strategic  importance
on the exposed southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance where the Soviet Union
had been increasing its naval presence.  More recently, the general  issues of
relations with Arab countries, the Middle East conflicts,  and the security of
petroleum and gas  supplies have colored EC views on  relations  with
mediterranean countries.  Some of the factors behind the EC's Mediterranean
policy have a striking resemblance to those behind the U.S.-Caribbean
policy. 11/
Bilateral agreements with Mediterranean  countries cover trade arrangements and
various forms of cooperation and financial aid.  The countries are the
Maghreb--Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia;  the Mashreq--Egypt, Jordan,  Syria, and
Lebanon;  and Cyprus,  Malta,  Israel, Portugal, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.
In general the EC  is  the major trading partner and runs  a  trade surplus  with
each of the  countries.  EC  financial aid to southern Mediterranean countries,
averaged on an annual basis 1977-81 about $145 million;  in  recipient per  head
terms,  most of  this aid was  in the $1 to $3 range (except for Cyprus at $10
and  Malta at $15).
The individual agreements have common elements:
o  Duty-free access  to  the  EC  for  industrial  goods;
o  Preferential access for some major agricultural products,  but  within well-
defined  limits;
o  Access to  EC  development grants and loans;
o  Renunciation by the EC of preferential access to  the Mediterranean
countries;  and
o  Consultation mechanisms.
In view of  the similarity in climate between the Mediterranean countries and
EC members bordering the Mediterranean, a higher proportion of the
Mediterranean farmers'  agricultural output may be in competition with EC
agricultural production than  compared  with  the  output  from  other developing
countries.  In general the  import provisions of the CAP for Mediterranean
agricultural products are of three types:  substantial barriers (relatively
high tariffs--sometimes a reference price system throughout the year);  lower
barriers  for  noncompetitive, off-season products  (new  potatoes and tomatoes);
or duty-free access where there is not much EC production  (citrus).  The
principal competitive  products  imported  from  the Mediterranean  countries
include:  olive  oil,  wine,  some  citrus,  and  potatoes.  The  export  value  of  EC
11/ "Caribbean Basin  Initiative," U.S.  State  Department Bulletin,  April  1982.
170trade  concessions to Mediterranean countries may be around $200 million.
Hunt 12/ has suggested that in relation to the main concessions on fruit and
vegetables:  "...  the tariff concessions  in the agreement have been of
marginal benefit to the third countries which possess them.  In periods of
oversupply, the concessions can be suspended.  In periods of undersupply,
there is ample room for countries with and without concessions to enter the
market so that benefits to the third country supplier, which has the
concessions, are marginal.  The proliferation of  such concessions among a
wider range of commodities and to a broader group of countries has further
weakened the benefit to any single country.  The tariff concessions, however,
do enable the countries which possess them to retain part of  the levy that
generally goes to EEC producers and exporters  through the farm income and
export subsidy programs of the CAP."
The enlargement of the EC-10 to  include Spain and Portugal will substantially
erode the trade concessions  in the EC's agreements with the Mediterranean
countries.  The enlarged Community will then have a surplus in most
Mediterranean products.  Morocco and Tunisia are likely to be the hardest hit,
and olive oil  the first big market to disappear.  According to EC commission
estimates,  the EC-12 would  likely have a structural olive oil surplus of
200,000  tons.  This quantity is  equivalent to four times what Tunisia, the
EC's biggest external suppplier, exported annually to the EC-9,  in recent
years.
The ACP Countries.  The Lome Convention, which provides for trade and aid  to
developing countries,  is the centerpiece of  the EC developing country
relation- ship.  Not only is  the Lome Convention a format for institutional
links with half of the Group of  77,  it is also seen as providing a superior
set of relations with the Third World compared  to  those of the United States
or other developed countries.
The provisions of the 1980-85 Convention between the EC-10 and 61 mostly poor
developing countries  in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific  (the ACP
countries) cover:  trade cooperation (free access, without reciprocity, to EC
markets);  insurance schemes  (STABEX, for export-earning stabilization on 43
mainly tropical agricultural products);  SYSMIN (for maintenance of productive
capacity for minerals);  a sugar protocol to provide price guarantees and
market access  for 14 ACP sugar exporters;  industrial cooperation (training,
technology transfer, and finance);  agricultural cooperation (finance,
training,  and a  Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation);  and
financial and technical cooperation.  Under the European Development Fund
(EDF),  a total 5.7 billion ECU over the 5-year period is  provided.
One summary, somewhat extreme, view of Lome,  is  that of Green, 13/ who has
characterized Lome as "a  not very major redrawing of a particular set of
colonial merchantilist relationships to take account of not very extreme
peripheral state pressures for a less uneven deal within the old order, and
has had remarkably little overall  impact either on the EEC or the ACP
components  with  the  probable  exception  of  their respective  beet  and  cane  sugar
sectors.  It  is  a  reflection  of  relationships,  not  a  major  causal  factor".
12/  H.  D.  Hunt.  "Fruit and  Vegetable  Exports  from  the  Mediterranean Area
to the EEC,"  World Bank Staff Working Paper No 321, March 1979.
13/ R. H. Green "The Child of Lome:  Messiah, Monster or Mouse?"  in The
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Political Economy of EEC Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States,
Frank Long  (ed).  London:  Pergamon Press, 1980.Certainly the trade and aid significance of Lome for the EC economy is small.
In 1980, 3.6 percent of EC imports  and 3.1 percent of EC exports were with ACP
countries, and this pattern has not changed very much.  ACP exports are nearly
all primary products (the biggest item is  oil from Nigeria),  and their  imports
from the EC are nearly all manufactures.  The agricultural imports from ACP
countries, 30 percent of the total, were worth $7.8 billion in 1980.  These
accounted for 17  percent of EC agricultural imports from all developing
countries, and 12  percent of total EC  agricultural imports.
The CAP has affected at  least three of  the Lome provisions:  trade
cooperation, export earnings, stabilization,  and financial aid.  I4/  On trade,
the CAP is  a factor affecting competitive products;  notably it  is a factor in
the establishment and management of EC import quotas  for duty- free access for
sugar or beef from ACP countries.  In relation to the insurance schemes,
STABEX does not cover CAP products  such as rice, sugar, and beef,  so ACP
exports, above the largely static sugar and beef quotas to  the EC,  are not
covered.  The financing of the CAP from Community funds could be a factor in
determining  the product coverage of STABEX.  The desire to  limit expenditure
on aid, such as  for STABEX, in order to finance the CAP, may be one of the
reasons why minerals are not  covered by STABEX.  For instance, the cost of
including copper in 1976 would have been more than twice the annual allocation
to  STABEX of  the funds available  (112 million ECU),  so  they were cut back by
half. 15/  In 1981, claims were four times the funds  available  (112 million
ECU),  so EC member countries doubled their contribution and cut back the
payments by half.
The main economic component of Lome concerns EC developing country trade.
Under Lome, 98 percent of ACP exports enter the EC duty free.  Imports subject
to duty are negligible and only 2  percent are subject to  levies  (rice, sugar,
and beef).
Hewitt and Stevens 16/  point out that the Lome concessions  ignore the dynamic
context of  changes the ACP countries desire in the  structure of  their trade.
Most of the exports from the ACP countries are raw materials which would get
duty-free access anyway, the preferential access  for some products--cocoa  and
bananas--is  partially at  the  expense of other developing  countries,  and the
ACP countries are not in a position to  benefit greatly from duty-free access
for  industrial products.
The main exception to the freedom from customs duties and quantitative-
restrictions  is  for  imports of  agricultural products which are directly or
indirectly covered by the CAP.  Basically, for duty-only items ACP countries
are granted exemption, and,  for levy products  there are a series of  special
arrangements.  For beef and veal,  rice, fruit and vegetables,  and raw tobacco
there is  total or partial exemption under certain conditions notably
quantitative limits.
One of the two main economic concessions concerns an annual quota of 30,000
tons of beef and veal for four African counties--Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar,
14/  Harris, S.,  and others.  The Lome Convention and the Common
Agricultural Policy.  Commonwealth Secretariat, December 1978.
15/  B. Persaud, "Export Earnings in the ACP/EEC Convention" in F. Long,
(ed.).
16/  Hewitt, A.,  and C. Stevens, "The Second Lome Convention in EEC and the
Third World:  A Survey, C. Stevens  (ed.), Holmes Meier, 1981.
172and Swaziland.  These imports, nearly all of which are to  the United Kingdom,
are free of  customs duties,  and the  levies applicable are  reduced  by  90
percent, provided an amount equivalent to that reduction  is  collected  by  the
beneficiary  countries.  The  export  (f.o.b.)  value  of  these  shipments  at  $2,000
a ton is approximately $60 million.  The EC is  a beef  exporter,  so  this
concession has an EC budgetary significance in terms of  additional expenditure
on beef-export subsidies.
The sugar arrangements provide for 14 ACP states  (and 4 territories) to  supply
the EC with 1.28 million tons of white sugar at a guaranteed  price.  At  18
cents a pound, this  commitment is  worth $508 million.  The  EC  commission  uses
the example of Mauritius  (quota, 487,200 tons).  The  difference  between  the
guaranteed price for the 1977/78  crop year and the average world price
(July-December 1977) amounted to, taking its quotas into  consideration,
approximately 68 million ECU, and for the 1978/79 crop  year,  approximately  84
million ECU;  that is  over 10 percent of its  GNP, 27  percent of  its total
export earnings,  or coverage of 1 year's imports of  Community  equipment  and
manufactures.
Generalized System of Preferences  (GSP).  The CAP is  generally considered to
have been a major influence on the agricultural content  of  the  EC's  GSP
scheme.  The Community's  scheme was the  first and is  the  largest of the 11
tariff preference schemes adopted by OECD countries.  Begun in the period
1971-76,  the schemes have the objective  of  increasing developing  country
export earnings, promoting their  industrialization, and  accelerating  their
economic growth.  They offer exporters  in developing countries  the advantage
of lower tariffs over developed country exports  competing on most favored
nation (MFN) terms. The schemes were adopted by the OECD countries  on a
unilateral, nonbinding basis and are now an important feature  of  international-
trade policy.  In 1980,  imports eligible  for inclusion in  all  GSP  schemes  from
over 100 beneficiary countries were about $55 billion, equivalent to 31
percent  of  dutiable  imports  from  all  beneficiary  developing  counties.
In practice, however, and perhaps  for reasons to do with the preliminary
notification requirements, the absence of incentives  to  request GSP treatment
and  rules  of  origin,  the  amount  of  imports  actually  accorded  GSP  treatment  in
1980 was $25  billion.  In the same year, actual EC, United States,  and
Canadian imports under the GSP reached respectively $9.3,  $7.3,  and $0.75
billion.  Nearly three quarters of  this trade  is with 10 countries  (in order
of  importance):  Taiwan  ($1.7 billion, benefits only from the United States),
South Korea  ($1.5 billion), Hong Kong  ($1.5 billion),  Brazil ($1.4 billion),
followed by Yugoslavia, India, Mexico, Malaysia, Singapore, and the
Philippines.
The preference schemes are a compromise between the developing countries'
desires for unrestricted market access  and fears in the industrialized
countries  about  market disruption.  The  concern  that the  schemes  should  not  be
prejudicial to the OECD economies has led  to a relatively poor coverage in the
agricultural sphere.  The EC scheme has evolved to cover, by 1981, some 317
processed agricultural products with an offer value of $2,088 million  (1,820
million ECU).  Actually, $1,870 million (1,625 million ECU) were exported
under  GSP.  GSP  covers  roughly  about  8  percent  of  total  developing  country
agricultural exports  to  the  EC.  About  80  percent  of  these  GSP  imports  have
either tariff reductions ranging from 20-50 percent or are granted duty-free
access  (covering 73 products),  and for which there are no quantitative
limitations.  The  average  preferential  margin  for  agricultural  products  in
1981 was 7.4 percent.
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($340 million ECU), which are subject to  individual or global tariff quotas.
These are soluble coffee, cocoa, butter, two types of pineapple, and Virginia
tobacco.  In these cases, there is  an automatic  introduction of custom duties
once the national limit  in a Community country is  reached.  Except perhaps in
the case of tobacco, these quantitative restrictions,  for which the ceilings
and EC country allocations  have largely remained constant  in recent years,
reflect protectionism of the food-processing  industry rather than of
agricultural production.
In practice, there has been an evolution in the EC's GSP.towards greater
consideration of the least developed countries.  Since 1977,  this group has
had complete exemption from duties on industrial products  (including  textiles)
without any limitation.  Since 1979, they have had duty-free access on all the
agricultural products on the GSP list,  and since 1981,  some new products were
added just for the least developed  countries.  The EC commission proposals for
the GSP for 1983-85,  reflecting pressures from the European Parliament,
include the suggestion that the least developed countries receive the same
benefits as ACP suppliers  (duty-free access, except on levy items)  on
agricultural products  (CCT, Chapters 1-24).  This could be a step toward
removing some of the discrimination between the poorer countries,  that the
present hierarchy of EC schemes has created.
In the EC's  agricultural trade relationship with developing countries the GSP
does not loom large, partially because, as stated earlier, 59 percent of  the
imports from developing countries already enter duty free.  Some  idea of the
extent of  the concession can be gleaned from relating the GSP utilization
figure--1,675 million  ECU in 1981, to the total value of  imports  from
developing countries on which duties are levied, 6,636 million ECU in 1979
(one-third of the total);  those are very roughly the concessions related to
about a quarter of the total value of dutiable imports.  The major  constraints
on improving the offers, namely protection for EC farmers,  protection for EC
food processors, and some protection for ACP farmers  and food processors from
competition from other countries  in EC markets have not been analyzed in
quantitative terms.  The track record shows that the Community has tried to
make progress with the agricultural content of the GSP, both in terms of
redistributing benefits between developing countries and  in increasing the
overall  level of benefits.
Cereal Substitutes
The EC imports  large amounts of cereal substitutes and  complements to  them
(for example, soybeans).  This  is  a result  of  its policies  of high cereal
prices  (and inappropriate price relations between cereals)  and of  low levels
of protection on the substitutes and  some of their complements.  Imports of
cereal substitutes such as  cassava, citrus pulp, molasses, and maize gluten
feed are apt to be viewed by the Commission and EC wheat producers in "cereal
equivalent" terms.  This perception, reinforced by the CAP principle of
Community preference, sustains the view that the cereal substitutes are an
import concession, and this provides a  justification for export (with
subsidies) of  an equivalent amount of cereals.  Claude Villain, the former EC
Director-General  for Agriculture, claimed in 1981 the EC was still a  net
"cereal equivalent" importer.  Such views seem to be partially sustained by
the United States, said Villain, because it would be more logical  if cereal
exporters who complained about EC cereal exports would urge the EC to stop
importing cereal substitutes which made such cereal exports necessary.  In
practice, he said some exporters unreasonably complain of a lowering in EC
174grain  imports, and at the same time take advantage of  the  expanding  EC  market
for cereal substitutes.
EC imports of cereal substitutes  in  1981 were estimated  at 18 million tons, of
which 10.5 million tons, or approximately $945 million worth (at  $90 a ton)
came  from  developing  countries.  The  main  developing  country  shipments--6.5
million tons in  1981--are of cassava, with a f.o.b. value, at  $90 a  ton for
pellets, of $585 million.  If  the Commission's "cereal equivalent" argument is
taken at face value, the 10.5 million ton figure implies  that cereal-
substitute imports from developing countries possibly cost the EC budget $500
to $750 million.
The EC is  endeavoring to  limit both the cost to the EC  budget  and  the  erosion
of  cereal farmers' incomes, attributable to the  imports of cereal
substitutes.  Estimates of the forgone quantity of home-grown cereals  that
would  have been consumed in  the absence of the cereal  substitutes  in  the  EC
vary a  great deal.  Stohr has suggested that the use  of  cereals  in  compound
feeds  would  be  no  more  than  3-4 million tons  higher.  This  was  because
compound feed production would have developed more slowly,  and  the  substitutes
would have been replaced not by cereals but by oilcakes  (some of which come
from developing countries).  Also, he felt the additional cereals used would
largely be imported feed grains.
While the extent of the developing countries'  share of the additional bhrdens
cereal substitutes impose on the EC budget  is a matter for more research, the
benefits to developing countries from the trading opportunities  in cereal
substitutes are already fairly clear.  The benefits  to  Thailand, for example,
from nongrain feed exports are substantial.  In 1980,  the export earnings from
cassava, 90 percent of which went to the EC, were equivalent  to  2.2  percent  of
GDP;  they accounted for 21 percent of the agricultural exports, 12  percent of
total exports,  and earned $730 million.  The regional  impact on growth from
income and employment is  also very significant, as much of the production is
in one region, the Northeast Region.  The export restraint agreements the EC
has recently negotiated with Thailand  (quota set at 5 million tons for 1982
with a possible 500,000 tons extra),  Indonesia  (500,000 tons),  and China,
seem, at  this stage, to limit further increases in imports.  Shipments above
these levels will pay more than the 6-percent ad valorem duty currently
levied, and will compete with zero-rated corn gluten and citrus pulp, much of
which comes  from the United States.
Pricing
Commodity Pricing Issues.  The EC has  long stressed the importance of
commodity-pricing  issues.  Its basic stance is  that international commodity
agreements  and  insurance  mechanisms  like  its  own  STABEX  and  the multilateral
schemes  like  the  IMF  Compensatory  Financing  Facility  can  be  in  the  mutual
interests  of  all  participants in  international markets,  and  should  be  used
Wherever  feasible.  There  is  perhaps,  more  so  in  the  past,  an  ideological
content in EC views;  this has weakened somewhat and there is  more pragmatism
now.  There  are  various  examples  of  pragmatism  on  pricing  issues.  The  EC  did
not join the International Sugar Agreement, though some coordinated
stockholding with the members of the International Sugar Organization is  now
underway.  The negotiations over the UNCTAD Common Fund showed that the EC,
while sympathetic to international action on pricing  issues, does not accept
the thesis that markets should be rigged to  transfer resources  to  developing
countries.  Nevertheless, there remains much skepticism and little confidence
in unorganized international agricultural markets.
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provisions  is an essential prerequisite for an adequate  standard  of
international food security.  To what extent this is  a  posture  rather  than  a
substantive position is  not very clear, but the evidence perhaps now supports
the former view.  The publicized reasons for the breakdown of the
International Wheat Convention negotiations include divergencies between
countries over stock levels.  The EC understocks relative to its use of world
markets.  In the absence of an international wheat agreement, it has not
developed and published a formal stock policy  like the  main  cereal  exporter,
the United States.  This issue is  discussed further  in a later section on food
security.
Though hardly discussed in Community statements on commodity-pricing  issues
and barely analyzed in commission documents,  including a recently requested
report for the European Parliament, the Community's export  subsidies  are  such
that the Community and  its CAP policies  are daily influencing the prices
developing countries  receive for their exports and pay for their imports.
The main commodity markets affected are those for beef,  dairy products,  sugar,
and wheat.  These commodities accounted for 24 percent  of developing
countries' agricultural imports  in 1979.  CAP products  account  for  91  percent
of EC agricultural exports to the developing countries.  Products  whose  prices
are influenced by EC export subsidies accounted for about  a  third  of
developing countries' agricultural exports to the world.
Basically, production and export subsidies are apt to  damage the functioning
of international markets.  They contribute to sending the wrong price signals
to producers and consumers.  The impact on any one country  depends  upon  the
market situation, and the trade barriers and market shares of the main
traders.  In general, world-market prices are lower than they would have been
if  there were no export subsidies.  When international prices are strong,
probably the main effect of EC export subsides is on the volume sold, as
exporters without export subsidies loose that share of the market taken by the
EC.  When international prices are weak, probably the  main  effect  is  upon
prices,  as the price level applying to all exporters is depressed further by
the EC undercutting other exporter's prices.
Financial Issues and Development Assistance
In the early eighties the EC considered the two principal financial  issues in
the North-South dialogue to be:  (a)  financing deficits  and growth in the
nonoil developing countries,  and (b)  investing oil surpluses.  Official
international initiatives were deemed necessary in relation to support and
supplement private-sector recycling by sustaining the flow of credit from
banks, to encourage other forms of resource transfer using market mechanisms,
and  to  improve  official  development  assistance  (ODA).  In  relation  to  the
topical  issue of developing country indebtedness, there is  no use of credit
measures  in  the  CAP  comparable  to  the  role  export  credits  play  in  U.S.
agricultural trade policy.
The  Community,  in  many  of  these  wide  ranging  global  financial  issues,  serves
mainly as a forum for the evolution of a common position.  The Community has
few  formal  policies  in  the  regulatory/bureaucratic  sense  in  many  of  these
fields.  The EC's development assistance program, is  small in financial terms,
relative to that of the total  for the individual development assistance
programs of member countries.  In 1980, EC disbursements at $1.5 billion were
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assistance, including that channeled through multilateral organizations.  EC
aid is  channeled through the European Development Fund;  the  general  budget
(food aid--$437 million, aid to non-ACP countries--$202 million,  and  to
Mediterranean countries, which altogether totaled $668 million in 1980);  and
the European Investment Bank  (project aid to non-EC countries  mostly  went  to
Mediterranean countries, and to a lesser extent ACP;  totaling totaled $295
million in 1980).  Geographically, Africa receives 67  percent of the aid,  Asia
20 percent,  and South America 7  percent.
The level of Community plus member-country aid compares very favorably with
North American performance.  In 1981, ODA from EC  countries was more than
double that of the United States.  In per capita terms,  ODA  was  for  the  EC,
Canada, and the United States, respectively $50,  $45,  and $31  in 1980.  A
similar pattern occurs  in aid to the agricultural sector,  where  commitments  by
EC countries  in 1980, which totaled $1.6 billion, compared with $1 billion
from the United States.
The CAP has had a  perceptible influence on the EC development  policy  in  at
least four ways.  It provides:
o  Competition for budgetary allocations;
o  Pressure for aid to certain countries because of  CAP  trade  problems,
such as, Thailand;
o  Pressure not to provide project aid for products  that  would  compete
with EC production, such as,  sugar;  and
o  Pressure for food-aid allocations, in preference to other forms of
development assistance.
In the EC, the competitive process  for funds between different policy areas is
not quite the same as  in a national administration.  The multilateral
arrangements  for the EC budget are such that national  annual parliamentary
authorizations are largely not needed.  The EC Council  of  Ministers  has
exercised its wide discretion to allocate most funds to the CAP  (62 percent of
expenditure),  to the detriment of other policies,  including  development  (4
percent of expenditures in 1982).  This seems  likely to continue.
Both from a donor and recipient perspective, there  is  a  margin of
substitutability between trade and aid.  Bilateral trade  imbalances, partially
as a result of trade distortions, have often been made more politically
tolerable by increasing aid  levels.  The EC used aid as a factor in the
agreement with Thailand to  limit exports of  cassava to the EC.  So the
additional EC aid funds  channeled to Thailand, one of  the more successful
developing countries,  are either at  the expense of  other poorer developing
countries, or the real value of total funds available for concessional
development assistance has been reduced by such actions.
The  quality  of  aid  can  also  be  influenced  by  pressures  derived  from  the  CAP  to
limit  competitive  crop  production  by  aid  recipients.  While  the  attempts  of
the  United  States  to  limit World  Bank  loans  for  palm oil  development--as  such
oils  compete  with U.S.  soybean  oil--are  well  known,  there  are  similar
pressures  within  the  EC,  namely  to  limit aid  to  sugar projects.
Food aid  seems to have sufficient credibility among taxpayers in donor
countries to make it one of the more acceptable forms for the transfer of
resources to developing countries.  Such transfers are,  in general, declining
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the expense of less restricted forms of aid become more pertinent.  A recent
example is  the case of Zimbabwean sugar.  To meet the request for a sugar
quota, the EC had to reconcile the conflicting desires, not to  increase the
global quota and not cut the existing quotas.  As a result, Zimbabwe received
a quota based on the unexhausted quotas of other ACP states and a promise that
if this was insufficient, the sugar would be exported as  food aid.
pood Aid
EC member countries, in view of their traditional role as  food  importers, have
not, until recently, had the capacity to be major suppliers of  food aid.  Nor
have they been very enthusiastic about  food aid as a development policy
technique.  This  lack of enthusiasm is partially reinforced by EC budgetary
procedures and politics, since domestically produced food aid involves  income
redistributive effects between member countries.  Nevertheless, the combined
food aid programs of  the member states and the EC are substantial, involving
an expenditure of ECU 644 million in  1980.
The EC's main commitments  on cereals for food aid were increased by 29  percent
in  1981, when the new Food Aid Convention (FAC) replaced the earlier 1976
version.  The Community provides  22 percent of the FAC commitment (1.65
million tons:  928,000 tons by EC institutions  and  770,000 tons by member
states).  The EC is  the major supplier of dairy products as  food aid,  though
the amount has basically remained constant since 1976.
In  terms of EC budgetary expenditure, the cost of  food aid in  millions of
units of account (UA) in  the period 1975-79 was successively UA 189,  438,  295,
518, and 644.
Food aid policy has been in the public limelight in the EC  in recent years.
Reports by the EC Court of Auditors revealed various administrative and
political problems. i_/ For example, the  auditors found that it took an
average 377 days for cereals and 535 days  for dairy products  to arrive in
Asia's ports once the program had been agreed.  Three incompatible policies
that  limit  the  usefulness  of  EC  food  aid  to  recipients  are:
o  Annual programming, to ensure Council  control over distribution;
o  Distribution to a large number of  countries, often in small
quantities  (26  countries got  22 percent of supplies);  and
o  Small, dispersed staff.
The CAP undoubtedly contributes to the availability of  food aid,  especially
of wheat for food aid.  So far,  the Council of Ministers has not yet decided
to explicitly increase the amount of wheat going to food aid.  Though current
world-market conditions are conducive to an increase in food aid shipments,
such shipments remain in EC budgetary terms more expensive than shipments,
using export subsidies.  Nevertheless the EC has some room to maneuver  in the
North-South context on food aid, in view of public support and the physical
availability of supplies.
16/  E.  C.  Court of Auditors, "Special Report on Community Food Aid,"  30
October 1980, DOC. 1-662/80.
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The EC views food security as  a  priority issue in the  North-South  dialogue.
For food issues, there is a suitable international forum--the  World  Food
Council, which is  small  (36 members), global (all countries  participate  in
the selection process), has a  broad mandate, and meets annually at the
ministerial level.  Other subject areas  in the dialogue--such  as  energy--lack
such  a  forum  and  so  far,  there  is  no  institutional  format  for  the  "global"
North-South dialogue.
In the EC view, the primary means to achieve food security is  to  increase
food production, particularly in the poorer developing countries.
Responsibilities  for this lie with the developing countries themselves, to
implement national food plans or strategies  (price and credit policies,
storage, transport, land tenure, development of cooperatives,  and so on) to
increase food production.  To support these endeavors,  the EC Council
believes the international community, as the EC has done, should provide
backing for the preparation and  implementation of  food strategies  in
individual countries.  In addition, the Commission believes  endeavors  should
be  made  to  improve  the  volume  and  quality  of  aid  to  agriculture,  improve
agricultural research, and in particular, evolve production  systems  less
dependent on imported energy.
Meanwhile, as long as countries are dependent on food  imports, they can be
helped, in the commission's  view, by greater stability  in international
markets for cereals and other commodities;  better storage/reserve systems
appropriate to their needs;  an EC export policy (longer  term  contracts  and
credits);  and by greater access for agricultural products  in  industrialized
(including EC) countries' markets.  Improvements in the volume/quality of
food aid are seen as a measure to particularly help the poorer countries.
Rather than wait for the outcome of the North-South Dialogue  and  partially  in
response to greater public concern and pressures from the European
Parliament,  the  Commission made  proposals  "towards  a  plan  of  action  to  combat
world hunger" in 1981 and "a special programme to  combat  Hungerhin  the  world"
in June 1982,  that basically consist of a series of development policy
measures to improve the food situation, particularly in the poorer developing
countries.  The Council has responded mainly by increasing food aid  for the
least developed countries, some of which were channeled though the
International Emergency Food Revenue (IEFR).
So far the Commission has not tackled the question of what contribution a
reform  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  could  make  to  the  world  food  system
by, in particular, seeking better complementarity with developing countries'
agriculture.  The CAP is one of the main reasons why the Commission, in its
recent initiatives, has used only development policy options.  The main,
shorter  term  international  agricultural policy  option  to  deliver  improved
food security for all countries has long been considered by the Council  and
the Commission to be an international grains arrangement.  However, this
involves an agreement among others with the United States, an agreement that
has  thus  far proved  elusive.
The commission's recourse, to development policy options only to improve
developing countries' food security (either bilaterally or multilaterally),
is  influenced  by  the  CAP.  Presumably,  the  commission  has  recognized  that its
main  CAP-related  proposals  are  not  currently feasible.  An  international
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lack of U.S. support and the EC-U.S. conflicts over wheat export subsidies.
Similarly, EC member states are not supportive of more agricultural trade
liberalization to provide developing countries with more export earnings to
pay for food import.
Some of the enthusiasm for development policy options may be traced to some
evidence that stabilization of the  international cereals' market will solve
only some of the many food security problems of the developing countries.  In
1980, only 6  percent of total cereal consumption  in  the poor countries (those
with per capita incomes below $699  in  1978) was imported;  whereas, the
middle-income countries  imported about 23 percent  of  their cereal
consumption.  However, of the  76  countries in  the low-income group, 38
imported more than 21 percent of  their consumption.  So the functioning of
the international cereals market, which is  the main international relations
issue in  the  food security aspects of the dialogue, seems to be important for
about half the poor countries;  though in  population terms,  they account for
only 9  percent of the population of this group of  developing countries.
By pooling risks--across regions and time--the  international cereals market
can provide the cheapest insurance of cereal availability.  The EC, along
with other major users of the market--who are not poor countries--
collectively determine market size and structure and so determine the  food
security capability of the  international cereals market.  Flexibility in  the
cereal-trading system stems from adjusting stocks,  consumption,  and
production  levels.
Stock adjustment.  While all countries need stock policies  for national food
security purposes,  it  is  primarily the major traders who have reserve or
buffer-stock responsibilities  because of the  size of  their international
market shares and their interests in  expanding  the cereal-trading system and
bringing greater stability to  farmers' incomes  and consumer prices.  The
major traders do not usually distinguish between stocks used in  the
management of their domestic markets and stocks used in  relation to trade.
In  the first  instance, it  is  stocks used in  relation to trade that are of
concern to the international community.
Clearly the CAP has improved the capacity of  the EC  to use reserves in  an
internationally responsible manner.  The physical supplies are there, though
the storage capacity may not be.  Yet the consensus of academic research and
the opinion of other major stock holders is  that the EC understocks.  The CAP
provides  the  option  of  understocking  because  of  the  use  of  explicit  export
subsidies, which have not been extensively used by the other major exporters
since 1972.  The EC has a  financial incentive to use such subsidies as  it  is
cheaper from the EC budgetary point of view than to hold in  stock a  higher
proportion of the current surplus.  The CAP's administrative arrangements,
notably the public financing of  intervention stocks--as in  the United
States--are conducive to a  greater degree of  international reserve
coordination.  In contrast, in  Australia where growers finance the stocks,
stock levels tend to be low relative to  instability in  production and trade.
The usual criticism of EC stocking policies--that the stocks are too low and
are procyclical so that the EC destabilizes the international market--needs
clarification.  This is  not really a  criticism of  the CAP, per se, but merely
a  criticism of Commission budgetary practice.  Where the CAP really
constrains  the  EC  position  on  use  of  stocks  for  market  stabilization  is  in
the  field  of  consumption  adjustment.
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is  an important element of  world food security.  Of  the 40  percent of  the
world's cereals used for animal feed,  over 80 percent  is  consumed  in  OECD  and
CMEA countries.  The quantities  involved  in consumption adjustments  in  recent
years have been very large relative to  stock and trade  levels.  In 1974,  OECD
feed  use  fell  by  about  8  percent,  or  23  million  tons,  as  a  result  of
developments leading to higher prices.  This quantity was  equivalent  to  17
percent  of world stocks,  15 percent of  world trade,  and  48  percent  of
developing country imports  in 1974.  The EC does not  contribute  to  such
flexibility.  In that year  85 percent of the  fall  in OECD feed consumption
occurred in the United States,  which accounts  for just half of the  feed
consumption in OECD countries.  This  inadequate  sharing of  the burden of
international  adjustment  reflects the domestic  price-stabilization  objectives
and policy instruments  of  the CAP.  These objectives and  instruments  fall
within the purview of national  sovereignty, but the international effects  are
considerable.
Production adjustment.--Under  the CAP, most domestic producers are not
responsive to world-market conditions, particularly price  signals.  This
domestic  policy choice does not absolve the EC  from its  international
responsibility  to  ensure that  its policies are at least  neutral  toward,  if
not supportive of,  the international trading  system.  Again, the
unwillingness  to allow domestic prices to move with international  prices
lends  support to  the notion that the EC  should incur temporary  stockholding
responsibilities,  corresponding to  the amount that the international price
signals would have taken out of production.
Quantitative research is needed  to estimate stockholding levels  required to
offset effects  of the EC's  limited use of  consumption and production
adjustment.  While such work is  essential for measurement  of  the
international impact of EC cereal policy, this  impact  should  not  be  over
estimated.  U.S. cereal production  at 334 million tons  is  a much more
significant international  food security factor than  EC  production  at  130
million tons.
Conclusion
The priority that the EC gives  to  the North-South Dialogue  and the priorities
within it  are changing.  Currently, the slowdown in  the international  economy
and related financial issues  (IMF quotas,  debt levels)  are the EC's major
international preoccupation.  In terms of international  food security, the
need for more cereal stocks,  if not  stocking policies, has  disappeared.  So
far,  the EC's general policy performance towards  the developing countries
compares very favorably with the main practical  standard available--U.S.
performance.  More detailed analysis at  the developing country  level, taking
account of  aid, trade, and export earnings foregone due to protectionism
(CAP, textiles or otherwise) may well confirm this.  The negative  impact of
the  CAP  on  developing  countries  is  being  tackled,  but  it  is  not  on  the  same
scale as  that of OPEC or of U.S. monetary policy. 17/
17/  Bergsten, C. F.,  "The Costs  of  Reaganomics,"  in Foreign Policy, Fall
1981, suggests each additional percentage change  in U.S. interest rates adds
perhaps  $4  billion  to  developing  country  deficits,  and  that  such  a  change  has
a  bigger  impact  than  a  1 percent  change  in  oil  prices.
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